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In recent years copyright protection has witnessed an unprecedented 
increase at the national, regional and international levels and along with it 
a potential shift in theoretical underpinnings of copyright law toward an 
ingenious idea that copyrights should be defined as “rights that are, like 
natural property rights, permanent and absolute.”1 As rightly summarized 
by one commentator: “Copyright legislation has long been notorious for 
its embodiment of successful industry rent-seeking.”2 Worse still, the 
ever-increasing digitization of works, along with the deployment of 
technical measures to protect such works and the expansive use of the 
Internet, further exacerbate the divide between the IP-rich and IP-poor 
countries in their ability to benefit from such works. A new term, “digital 
divide”, was coined in the mid 1990s to reflect the perceived gap between 
the information haves and have-nots in the information age. In 2001 the 
G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force described the phenomenon as follows:  
 
This “digital divide” is, in effect, a reflection of existing broader 
socio-economic inequalities and can be characterized by 
insufficient infrastructure, high cost of access, inappropriate or 
weak policy regimes, inefficiencies in the provision of 
telecommunication networks and services, lack of locally created 
content, and uneven ability to derive economic and social 
benefits from information-intensive activities.3 
 
Accordingly, many efforts have been made to address the issue of the 
digital divide, mainly targeted at leveling the differences in telecom 
networks and Internet access and a humanitarian approach. For example, 
Peter Yu suggests turning the digital divide into “digital dividends” via 
five A’s: Awareness, Access, Affordability, Availability and Adaptability.4 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2001) 
(criticizing the recent argument that copyrights should not be the rights that “get defined or 
balanced against other state interests, but as rights that are, like natural property rights, permanent 
and absolute” and pointing out that “the ‘exclusive rights’ clause has become the ‘intellectual 
property’ clause”). 
 2. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 67-69 (2001). 
 3. Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force, Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the 
Challenge 6 (2001), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2001genoa/dotforce1.html 
(last visit July 14, 2005). The DOT Force was created by the G8 Heads of State at their 
Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, and comprised 43 teams from government, the private sector, and 
non-profit and international organizations, representing developed and developing countries. For 
a discussion about the concept of the digital divide, see also Haochen Sun, Copyright Law Under 
Siege: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Copyright Protection in the Context of the Global Digital 
Divide, IIC 36 (2/2005), 192-213; Pippa Norris, DIGITAL DIVIDE? CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, 
INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 45-47(2001). 
 4. Peter Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 6, 52 (2002). 
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However, this paper tries to deal with this longstanding and yet rapidly 
worsening problem by borrowing from experiences on how the 
telecommunications world provides universal service to each and every 
household at affordable prices, and endeavors to shed some new light on 
how the copyright divide can be narrowed. It is structured in three parts. 
The first part will examine the past and future failure of the current 
compulsory licensing scheme which was worked out in the last century in 
the international copyright treaties, followed by a study of the universal 
services arrangement in telecommunications in the second part. The third 
part will envisage a universal copyright fund for the world community to 
consider. It is our firm belief that in order to do the IP-poor more than lip 
service, citizens of the world and the international community should and 
can invent a workable mechanism.  
 
I. FAILURE OF THE COPYRIGHT COMPULSORY LICENSING REGIME 
 
A. Insertion of a Compulsory Licensing System into the Berne 
Convention 
 
Back in the middle of the last century, a “copyright war” broke out 
between the developed and developing countries. Those newly politically 
independent countries perceived that they were not economically 
independent enough and therefore that steps must be taken to surmount 
the barriers of economic development and nurture a sound environment 
for sustainable development. The provision of better education and 
vocational training, and the fostering of a viable technological base are, in 
these countries’ eyes, the preconditions for realization of their ambitions 
of political, economical, and cultural independence. Bringing these plans 
to fruition necessitated unfettered access to a wide array of educational 
and informational materials. However, copyright protection afforded by 
the Berne Convention was regarded by many as one of the major 
contributing factors giving rise to access problems, for it enabled 
publishers in the developed countries to charge overly high fees, and 
prevented people in the developing countries from benefiting from access 
to these unaffordable materials. Thus, issues regarding the affordability 
and availability of copyrighted materials occasioned by the international 
copyright regime occupied the center of the post-colonial debate for the 
equity and legitimacy of international law. Developing countries argued 
that the Berne Convention is one of the products of colonialism and that 
they were deprived of the equal chance to participate in the process of 
treaty-making-and-revision. The limited participation of developing 
countries tipped the Berne Convention in favor of developed countries’ 
interests and rendered it unsympathetic to their development needs. As 
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many developing countries proposed, the Berne Convention should be 
revised in a manner conducive to the promotion of economic, social, 
cultural and technological development in these countries. Developed 
countries, of course, were of the position that the sanctity of the Berne 
Convention and its core principles should and must be championed.  
Ironically, the reform of the international copyright system was first 
undertaken not within the framework of the Berne Convention, but in the 
context of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC),5 which sets forth 
relatively low standards for copyright protection. 6  The first meeting 
reflecting the needs of these “new” countries was jointly organized by 
UNESCO and the International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual 
Property (BIRPI) and was held at Brazzaville in 1963.7 While the initial 
intentions of twenty-three African countries were oriented towards the 
revision of UCC to accommodate their development policies, they 
ultimately shifted their concern towards modifying the Berne 
Convention.8 
Facing mounting pressure from developing countries9 and in order to 
attract more countries into the Berne Union,10 the 1964 Report of the 
Study Group rendered a statement friendly to developing countries : 
 
However, it is also necessary to promote the general development 
of copyright reforms intended to make the rules relating to it 
more simple to apply, as well as to adapt them to the social, 
technical and economic conditions of the contemporary 
community.11 
 
                                                                                                                            
 5. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 
U.N.T.S. 132, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. 
 6. Note that ‘relatively low’ implies the author does not feel they are very high, i.e., that they 
are rather low. “Lower” would mean lower than the Berne Convention, for example. Choose 
either depending on your meaning but don’t mix “relatively” and “lower”. 
 7. See Proposals for Revising the Substantive Copyright Provisions (Articles 1-20), Doc S/1, 
prepared by the Government of Sweden with the assistance of BIPRI, in WIPO, Records of the 
Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967, 137. BIRPI organized 
the administration of the Berne Convention before the inception of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization in 1967. UNSECO, under the lead of the United States, administrates the 
UCC 
 8. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 597-98 (1987). Professor Ricketson explained the reasons for this 
shift: “[i]n part, this was due to the impending revision of the Berne Convention, which none was 
then contemplated in relation to the UCC. Another reason may have been that the Berne 
Convention, in view of its longer history, was seen as the more prestigious instrument.” 
 9. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT : PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 
314 (2001). 
 10. See RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 600. 
 11. BIRPI, General Report of the Swedish/BIRPI Study Group, 1 July 1964, Doc DA/22/2, 
5. 
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The Report suggested a number of proposals to modify the Berne 
Convention in favor of developing countries, permitting the reservations 
of the obligations regarding translations, copyright duration, broadcasting, 
educational uses, and so forth. 12  The conflation of the above 
recommendations with those from the 1965 Committee of Governmental 
Experts 13  formed the final proposals for the revision of the Berne 
Convention. 14  At the same time, a separate protocol to the Berne 
Convention was also proposed to encompass the impending revisions for 
the developing countries.15 
The Stockholm Revision Conference convened in 1967 was marked 
by the polarized stance taken by some of the developing and developed 
countries. India, for example, argued that copyrights should not be 
absolute and there should be no barrier to the adoption of compulsory 
licenses in appropriate circumstances. 16  On the contrary, the U.K. 
delegation was in the strongest opposition to the revision, contending that 
“the Protocol appeared to be a way of giving economic assistance to 
developing nations at the expense of authors and that it was an 
inappropriate way of achieving this objective”. 17  Certain developed 
countries, such as France, Italy and Ireland were in the middle path and 
showed readiness to provide assistance to developing countries.18 Yet 
underneath their superficial willingness to make concessions was still the 
longstanding protectionist approach to the sanctity of copyright 
protection.19 Against this backdrop, the Protocol was adopted by the final 
plenary session of the Stockholm Conference. The lack of real 
compromise by the developed and developing nations foreshadowed the 
future failure of the Protocol. The Stockholm Protocol, among other 
things, established a compulsory licensing regime, albeit an extremely 
complex one, to override the translation right and the reproduction right 
for certain purposes. 
Unsurprisingly, the Stockholm Protocol was then met with strong 
opposition from interest groups in the developed countries. The prevailing 
                                                                                                                            
 12 . See Proposals for Revising the Substantive Copyright Provisions (Articles 1-20), 
Document S/1, prepared by the Government of Sweden with the assistance of BIPRI, in WIPO, 
Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967, at 
137-39. 
 13. See ibid., at 139-142. 
 14. See ibid., at 142-143. 
 15. See ibid., at 144. Being interim measures, these revisions would be abandoned by the 
countries when they reached higher level of development. Also, given the extensive nature of the 
revisions, “there were stylistic reasons for including them in a separate Protocol”. See 
RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 603. 
 16. See RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 607. 
 17. See RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 608. 
 18. Ibid. 
 19. For instance, France later adopted a more critical view of the Protocol and ultimately 
refrained from ratifying it. See RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 621. 
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viewpoint was that this Protocol had been embedded with too many 
concessions in favor of developing countries,20 and therefore “constitutes 
a sacrifice of the rights of authors in developed countries and jeopardizes 
the best interests of authors in developing countries.”21 The U.S. even 
warned that the adoption of the Protocol would create an insurmountable 
barrier to its desired accession to the Berne Convention. Thus, steps were 
later taken to overcome this shameful impasse.22 After years of turmoil 
and debates the revision of the Berne Convention and UCC proceeded 
simultaneously at the 1971 Paris Conference. At the end of this 
Conference, the revision of the Berne Convention and UCC, and the 
Appendix based upon the revised Stockholm Protocol, were ultimately 
adopted. 
The Berne Appendix subjects both the translation rights and the 
reproduction right in developing countries to compulsory licenses. In the 
case of the translation right, qualified countries may replace exclusive 
rights with nontransferable, nonexclusive licenses under conditions that 
include the expiration of at least three years from a work’s publication,23 
provided that a translation “has not been published in a language in 
general use in that country by the owner of the right of translation,”24 and 
that the license “shall be granted only for the purpose of teaching, 
scholarship or research.” 25  In respect of the reproduction right, the 
non-exclusive and non-transferable compulsory license is limited to 
copies made for use in “systematic instructional activities” 26  and is 
available if copies have not, within five years of publication, been 
distributed for this purpose at a reasonable price;27 in the case of works in 
the natural and physical sciences, the minimum period is reduced to three 
years,28 and in the case of fiction, poetry, drama, music, and art books, it 
is increased to seven years.29 In order to prevent trade diversion, the 
export of copies made under this compulsory license from the qualified 
                                                                                                                            
 20. Typical concerns were highlighted by one delegate of the U.S.: (1) the lack of any real 
guarantee that authors would be paid in cases of use for “teaching, scholarship and research”; (2) 
the problems that might arise with respect to the transmittal of compensation in the case of the 
other reservations; (3) the provisions allowing export of copies to other developing countries; (4) 
the inadequate definition of a developing countries and (5) the lack of any direct incentive to 
developing countries to improve the level of protection beyond that offered by the Protocol. See 
RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 621. 
 21. General Assembly of ALAI, 23 April 1968, Paris: [1968] Copyright 146. RICKETSON, 
supra note 8, 622. 
 22. See RICKETSON, supra note 8, at 625-632. 
 23. Berne Appendix, Article II: (2) (a). 
 24. Ibid. 
 25. Berne Appendix, Article III: (5). 
 26. Berne Appendix, Article III: (2) (a)(ii). 
 27. Berne Appendix, Article III: (2) (b). 
 28. Berne Appendix, Article III: (3) (i). 
 29. Berne Appendix, Article III: (3) (ii). 
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country is prohibited.30 
The Berne Convention and its Appendix were integrated into the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement)31 through the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiation.32 The integration reveals that, despite the passage of time, 
the Appendix is still an internationally respected instrument designed 
especially for the developing countries. In December 1996, WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) 33  was adopted at the WIPO Diplomatic 
Conference, expanding and updating the international legal framework 
established by the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention. The 
WCT only permits its members to “carry forward and appropriately 
extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their 
national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne 
Convention” and “devise new exceptions and limitations that are 
appropriate in the digital network environment”, 34  provided that the 
three-step test is met.35 
 
B. Developing Countries’ Inability to Fully Utilize Compulsory 
Licensing  
 
However, despite the existence of the Berne Appendix, many 
developing countries were unable to employ the instrument of compulsory 
licensing to mobilize and improve their educational and training systems, 
due to the lack of financial means to obtain even compulsory licenses 
from publishers in the developed countries to translate the needed books 
into local languages in the first place, and to purchase books if they were 
published at all under compulsory licenses. In addition, the following 
three factors further undercut developing countries’ ability to utilized 
compulsory licensing to enhance the availability of copyrighted materials. 
 
1. The Berne Appendix is Overly Strict, Complex and Ambiguous 
 
Conditions for granting compulsory licensing set forth in the Berne 
Appendix are overly strict, extremely complicated, and disturbingly 
                                                                                                                            
 30. Berne Appendix, Article IV: (4). 
 31. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–?
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 28.1 (1994). 
 32. Article 9 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement provides that “[m]embers shall comply with 
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.” However, the 
provision concerning moral rights was not incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement. See TRIPs 
Agreement, id., art. 9 (1). 
 33. WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65. 
 34. Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT. 
 35. See WCT, art. 10. 
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ambiguous. Berne Union or TRIPS members who are eligible to benefit 
from the concessions encompassed in the Berne Appendix, should satisfy 
and comply with the detailed requirements provided for in the Appendix. 
First, they should be developing countries in line with the two criteria 
stipulated in the Appendix: 
– any eligible member should be regarded as a developing country “in 
conformity with the established practice of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations”; and 
– with respect to its “economic situation and its social or cultural 
needs”, any eligible member does not “consider itself immediately in a 
position to make provision for the protection of all the rights as provided 
for in [Berne Convention]”. 
These two detailed conditions should be met simultaneously. Any 
violation of either requirement will render t a member ineligibile to enjoy 
the benefits accruing from the Appendix. As threshold criteria, however, 
they appear to be too vague and thus fail to proffer sufficient guidance to 
confirm the eligibility of beneficiary countries. The notion of “established 
practice” per se is not a defined concept in the context of United Nations 
systems.36 The other condition, in spite of its initial embedded intention 
to provide clarification, adds superfluous uncertainty to the ascertainment 
of eligible beneficiary countries, because the economic situation and 
social or cultural needs are somewhat subjective and sometimes extremely 
difficult to prove. 
Moreover, the eligible members must comply with the specific 
conditions for the granting of compulsory licensing. Article II of the 
Appendix may constitute the longest single provision extant in 
international treaties. Combined with Article IV of the Appendix, it 
generally sets up nine preconditions for the granting of compulsory 
licensing for the purpose of translation. Nonetheless, under these two 
Articles, there may be double or triple the number of sub-conditions 
awaiting to be adhered to. Although conditions to be met are extremely 
complex, the Appendix fails to systematize them to provide clear-cut 
guidance to which developing countries could make reference before the 
issuance of a compulsory license. The same could be said of Article III, 
which permits eligible developing countries to grant compulsory licenses 
overriding the reproduction right. In addition to their strictness and 
complexity, these Articles have been embodied with vague terms, leading 
to the problem of unpredictability. Article II, for example, requires that 
any compulsory license should be granted only for the purpose of 
“teaching, scholarship or research”. But, the nature of the excuses – 
                                                                                                                            
 36. See RICKETSON, supra note 8 (pointing out that the potential two criteria to shed light on 
the “established practice” are not universally acceptable ). 
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“teaching, scholarship or research” – are ambiguous in nature. Could they 
be commercial or only non-profit? It is very hard to construe this 
provision to make certain the extent of “teaching, scholarship or research” 
as legitimate excuses for granting compulsory licenses.  
 
2. Developing Countries Lack the Administrative and Legal 
Infrastructure 
 
Many developing countries may have not the administrative and legal 
infrastructure to design and implement the copyright law or administrative 
law to effectively avail themselves of the flexibility afforded by the 
Appendix, and to monitor domestic beneficiaries’ compliance with the 
requisite conditions provided for in the Appendix. Some developing 
countries, as we can see, are still ruled by man rather by the law. The lack 
of popular acceptance of the notion of rule of law makes it almost 
impossible to establish an effective legal system to implement the 
obligations mandated by the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement, 
not to mention adherence to the complex conditions in the Berne 
Appendix. Some developing countries have merely embryonic or 
rudimentary copyright laws which are not sophisticated enough to 
perform the obligations set forth in the Appendix. Although many 
developing countries have their own modern copyright laws, the 
enforcement of copyrights has been poorly organized, partly because of 
the lack of public respect for copyright law and partly because of the lack 
of an administrative law to effectively support the enforcement process. 
Upgrading their copyright protection, particularly the enforcement 
system, involves large sums of money. Many least-developed countries 
may not have the financial ability to do so. Therefore, in order to avoid 
the likely breach of obligations under the Berne Convention and its 
Appendix, many developing countries may have chosen not to utilize 
compulsory licensing. 
 
3. Fear of Unilateral Trade Sanctions 
 
Finally and perhaps most significantly, many developing countries 
fear that sanctions might be threatened, bilaterally or multilaterally. The 
combination of political pressures and unilateralism in copyright 
protection potentially impinges upon developing countries’ ability to 
utilize compulsory licensing which is likely to undermine the interests of 
the publishers in the developed countries. Starting from 1988, by using its 
powerful stick—Section 301 of its Trade Act—the U.S. has initiated, 
continued to rely on and will be unlikely to give up its unilateralism in 
foreign policy on intellectual property protection to escalate the level of 
2006] A Universal Copyright Fund 43 
international protection copyright protection. The presence of this annual 
“check-up” and “diligent” review of other countries’ domestic copyright 
protection has the potential to undermine the flexibilities afforded by the 
international copyright law.  
 
C. Simplification of Requirements for the Granting of Compulsory 
Licenses is Infeasible  
 
Compulsory licensing systems fail to achieve the initial aim of 
promoting access to affordable copyrighted materials. To resolve this 
conundrum, one solution would be to simplify the requirements regarding 
the granting of compulsory licenses. However, given the decades that it 
took to get the Appendix adopted, it is feared that the simplification will 
probably take again decades. Given the expansive structure of the 
international copyright regime, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to amend the Berne Appendix with consensus reached among 
member states. In addition, potentially insurmountable defects embedded 
in this approach undermine its feasibility and efficacy. 
The TRIPS Agreement incorporates the majority of the Berne 
Convention and its Appendix. Therefore, within the framework of current 
copyright regime, a question rises as to whether WIPO or WTO should be 
responsible for the amendment of the Berne Convention. If WIPO 
presided over the amendment, would all WTO Members accept 
amendments that alter the obligations under Berne Appendix, and vice 
versa? If the WIPO and WTO determined to collaborate in respect of 
amendment, would their member states accept such institutional 
cooperation or the final resultant amendment? Additionally, the 
procedures regarding national ratification of the amendment of treaty 
obligations may obstruct the final passage of the amendment to the Berne 
Appendix. As a general constitutional proposition, many countries would 
take the view that an amendment that substantially alters rights and 
obligations is, in essence, a new agreement that must be approved by their 
legislatures. This procedure may give powerful lobbyists from 
copyright-based industries the chance to persuade legislators to defeat the 
amendment. If the amendment were not ratified domestically, the 
amendment would eventually turn out to be in vain. Hence, considering 
the uncertainty of ratification at the national level, any amendment to the 
Berne Convention would be legally insecure.  
Moreover, due to the highly protectionist environment of international 
copyright protection, it is unlikely that the copyright giant countries and 
WIPO would support simplification of the Berne Appendix. The WIPO 
even recommends that the protection of intellectual property “is a tool that 
44 National Taiwan University Law Review [Vol. 1: 2 
may be used to narrow the digital divide”.37  
Even the procedural difficulty and highly protectionist environment 
were overcome, and even swiftly, we believe it is not fair to provide 
economic assistance to needed people at the expenses of authors. 
Therefore, it is sensible and equitable to seek an alternative path with 
popular participation to narrow the copyright divide. In the following 
section, we will propose an alternative approach. 
 




In advocating a fully interconnected monopoly for the provision of 
telecom services as opposed to competition the president of AT&T, 
Theodore Vail invented a slogan in 1907: “One policy, one system, 
universal service”, referring to interconnection of competing systems into 
a unified system under AT&T. As part of his strategy to restore the abating 
market power of AT&T due to the rising competition made possible by the 
expiry of its patents in 1893, Vail vigorously promoted regulation for 
monopoly telephone services.38 He declared, “If there is to be state 
control and regulation, there should also be state protection –protection to 
a corporation striving to serve the whole community… from aggressive 
competition which covers only that part which is profitable.”39 That 
appeal found legal and political support, because competition was at that 
time widely seen as chaotic and could lead to either undesirable 
cream-skimming activities and a wasteful duplication in the profitable 
urban areas or under-provision of telecom services in remote and 
uneconomic regions.40 Regulated monopoly appeared to offer a solution 
that allowed the benefit of economies of scale, left room for public input 
and control and avoided ruinous price competition that would destabilize 
the industry structure. 
In 1913, AT&T reached an antitrust-settlement with the Department 
of Justice in which AT&T agreed to refrain from acquiring any more 
directly competing companies. After the agreement the independent 
companies that were directly competing with AT&T exchanged territories 
so that each had a geographic monopoly and connected to the single 
long-distance network owned by AT&T. 41  By 1934, when the 
                                                                                                                            
 37. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET: A SURVEY OF ISSUES, para. 380, 
available at http://ecommerce.wipo.int/ survey/html/5.html.(emphasis added). 
 38. GERALD BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 31-32 (2003). 
 39. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 26 (1997). 
 40. HUBER, supra note 39, at 36-37. 
 41. HUBER, supra note 39, at 33. 
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regulated-monopoly policy was cemented into law by the Communications 
Act, most states had already empowered their utility commissions to shut 




1. Universal Service via Implicit Subsidy 
 
In the clear, Vail’s aspirations had nothing to do with an all-reaching 
penetration of telecom services in every household at an affordable price. 
Over time, the concept has changed significantly. With the establishment 
of monopolies under regulation, both the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC, with exclusive jurisdiction over interstate services) 
and state utility commissions (with exclusive jurisdiction over intrastate 
services) are obligated by law to oversee that the monopolistic telecom 
service providers “provide service on request at just and reasonable rates”. 
Regulators have thereby pursued a policy of “universal service” to make 
basic telephone service available throughout the U.S. at rates that are both 
affordable and relatively uniform.42 
From the beginning, a flat-rate price structure (with a fixed monthly 
fee and no additional charges for conversations) was used for local 
residential service to avoid the high costs of manually recording and 
charging for individual calls. This structure later became a politically 
favored rate structure protected by the state regulatory commissions who 
then despite inflation resisted any increase in the local fees to secure 
popular support.43 In contrast, early long-distance voice transmission was 
extremely expensive due to the high costs of electronics and the 
labor-intensive process in setting up relay calls. However, the rapid 
decline of costs for electronic components after the Second World War 
greatly reduced the costs of the provision of long-distance service. The 
cost reductions in long-distance services were transformed into price 
reductions for local services through a process known as “separation”: the 
Communications Act prescribed that the separation of costs among 
jurisdictions, therefore among local and long-distance telecom service 
providers, should be approved by the FCC. In 1947 the first such 
separations formula went into effect, splitting telephone equipment into a 
number of categories and allocating them between federal and state 
jurisdictions on the basis of relative use. When the FCC took initiative in 
1951 to require cut in AT&T’s interstate rates, state regulators protested 
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that the high earnings indicated a need for a change in the formula 
towards increasing the share of interstate revenue paid back to local 
operators, rather than for a reduction in the interstate long-distance rates. 
The FCC gave in to pressure from congressional leaders and state 
regulators and agreed to shift costs from the intrastate to the interstate 
jurisdiction and consequently increase the local telecom companies’ share 
of interstate toll revenue, thus eliminating the painful necessity to grant 
local rate increases. 44  High-volume long-distance callers and urban 
residents had to pay artificially high phone bills to subsidize and support 
universal service for others. 
In addition to large-scale implicit subsidies, U.S. regulators also 
endorsed a number of support programs that were open and explicit. The 
most important of these were: (a) the federal support programs for small 
companies with high local loop costs or stitching costs, namely the 
Universal Service Fund (borne entirely by long-distance carriers), (b) the 
Dial Equipment Minutes Weighting program, and the Long-Term Support 
program; as well as (c) the Lifeline and Linkup programs for low-income 
consumers. 45  It was mainly the implicit subsidy from long-distance 
telecom services to local telecom services that inter alia helped raise the 
percentage of U.S. households with telephone service from 61.8 percent to 
88.5 percent between 1950 and 1968. 
Not limited to the U.S., the notion of universal service and its 
implementation through one way or the other has been a common feature 
of the telecom sector across nations.46 So much so that it was mentioned 
by the reference paper prepared by the negotiating group on basic 
telecommunications of the WTO on April 24, 1996. 47  Undeniablly 
though, the scope and extent of universal service varies dramatically from 
developed to developing and least developed countries.48  
 
2. Statutory Universal Service 
 
In the U.S., the long-awaited 1996 Telecommunications Act 
abandoned the policy based on the assumption of natural monopoly, that 
service would be best provided by monopolies, and instead embraced a 
                                                                                                                            
 44. BROCK, supra note 38, at 187. 
 45. KENNEDY, supra note 42, at 186. 
 46. IAN LLOYD/DAVID MELLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 125 (2003). 
 47. The reference paper states: 3. Universal service  
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policy based on the assumption of interconnected competition in which all 
portions of the industry (including local basic markets) were potentially 
competitive. The patchwork of mechanisms that supported the goal of 
universal service then became inconsistent with that of deregulation and 
competition, because there existed a disparity between cost of service 
provision and price charged for it, and the cost averaging was hostile to 
technological innovation and suppressed competition (competition for 
low-cost, high-revenue services was banned, yet competition for 
high-cost, low-revenue services discouraged). Consequently, the 
Telecommunications Act set out a framework for comprehensive reform 
of the system and expanded the scope of universal service, which in many 
aspects could serve as an ideal example of universal service.49 
 
a. Universal Service Principles  
 
In accordance with the U.S Telecommunications Act, the FCC shall, 
with the assistance of a Federal-State Joint Board, base policies for the 
preservation and advancement of universal service on the following 
principles:  
?  Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and 
affordable rates.  
? Access to advanced telecommunications and information services 
should be provided in all regions of the Nation.  
? Consumers in all regions of the nation, including low-income 
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have 
access to telecommunications and information services, including 
interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and information 
services, that are reasonably comparable to those services provided in 
urban areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable 
to rates charged for similar services in urban areas.  
? All providers of telecommunications services should make an 
equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and 
advancement of universal service.  
? There should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and 
State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.  
? Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care 
providers, and libraries should have access to advanced telecommunications 
services.  
? Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission 
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determine are necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity and are consistent with this chapter.50 
 
b. Definition  
 
The U.S. Telecommunications Act understands universal service as an 
evolving level of telecommunications services that the FCC shall establish 
periodically, taking into account advances in telecommunications and 
information technologies and services, and therefore requires that the FCC 
in establishing the definition of the services shall consider the extent to 
which such telecommunications services:  
? are essential to education, public health, or public safety;  
? have, through the operation of market choices by customers, been 
subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers;  
? are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by 
telecommunications carriers; and  
? are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.51 
 
c. Funding of Universal Service 
 
(a) Via Universal Service Fund 
Universal service fund can take on at least two forms, virtual and real. 
The Taiwanese Telecommunications Act adopts a virtual universal fund in 
that it calculates on a yearly basis the losses and necessary management 
expenses arising from the universal services, collects them from the 
telecommunications enterprises publicly designated by the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication and reimburses the universal service 
provider.  
The U.S. Telecommunications Act foresees a concrete universal 
service fund to which telecommunications carriers make contribution: 
Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications 
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to 
the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the 
FCC to preserve and advance universal service. The FCC may exempt a 
carrier or class of carriers from this requirement if the carrier’s 
telecommunications activities are limited to such an extent that the level 
                                                                                                                            
 50. 47 USC 254 (b). With a moderate goal in mind, Article 20(1) of the Taiwanese 
Telecommunications Act prescribes: “To protect the basic telecommunications rights and interests 
of R.O.C. nationals, the  Ministry of Transportation and Communication may designate, based 
on different areas and service items, a Type I telecommunications enterprise to provide universal 
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certain quality that may be fairly enjoyed by all nationals at a reasonable price. 
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of such carrier’s contribution to the preservation and advancement of 
universal service would be de minimis. Any other provider of interstate 
telecommunications may be required to contribute to the preservation and 
advancement of universal service if the public interest so requires.52 
To implement the goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the 
FCC issued a series of orders. In 1997 the FCC announced the Universal 
Service Order, which ushered in an explicit universal service fund derived 
from percentage-based fees levied against telecom carriers. The Order was 
struck down by the 5th Circuit in 1999, because the court found that the 
support mechanism, by assessing the interstate and intrastate revenues of 
providers of interstate telecom services, violated section 2(b)’s prohibition 
on the federal regulation of “charges… in connection with intrastate 
communication.”53 The FCC then proposed the CALLS Order in 2001,54 
which established a transitional $650 million universal service fund. This 
fund was to be combined with the existing universal funds and programs, 
and all telecom carriers (including local, long distance, and wireless) were 
to pay into this fund proportionally based on their interstate retail 
revenues. Again the 5th Circuit revoked the Order in 2001 in Texas Office 
of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC (TOPUC II). According to TOPUC II, 
“affordability” mandated by 47 USC 254(b)(1)) is an aspirational 
guideline to be carefully balanced with other statutory objectives, the 
lofty, expansive language hardly constitute specific statutory commands. 
Congress gave the FCC the latitude to formulate a policy that considers 
affordability along with other policy goals; the establishing of the $650 
million Universal Service Fund was arbitrary and capricious because 
? although Interexchange Carriers (IXCs, i.e. long-distance carriers) 
and Local Exchange Carriers (LECs, i.e. local carriers) agreed on the 
amount to be paid, the FCC still has to exercise sufficiently independent 
judgment, which it failed to do; 
? the FCC also failed to provide some reason as to why it found one 
study among the 6 for the calculation of universal service fund (ranging 
from $250 million to $3,9 billion) to be more persuasive than the other. 
(b) Via Offsetting the Benefits from the Provision of Universal 
Service 
If we look at the other side of the Atlantic, to date only France and 
Italy have introduced funding schemes similar to that of the U.S. In the 
majority of European countries, no funding mechanism was put in place 
for the provider of universal service. In the UK for example, successive 
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studies by the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel) have argued that the 
British Telecommunications (BT) obtains a cost benefit from the 
provision of universal service for the following four reasons: 
?  Lifecycle-BT has a better chance of retaining unecomnomic 
customers when they become economic; 
?  Ubiquity-customers moving between areas know of BT as a 
potential supplier, but may not be aware of BT’s competitors; 
? Brand image-BT’s image is enhanced by serving uneconomic 
customers; and 
? Advertising opportunity-provided by payphones. 
According to the Office of Communications (Ofcom, succeeding 
Oftel), the current costs of Universal Service Obligation (USO) for BT are 
around £50-70m and the benefits are around £60m. Ofcom believes 
therefore that there is unlikely to be an undue financial burden on BT as a 
result of USO that would justify conducting a full cost benefit analysis 
and setting in place new USO funding arrangements.55 
 
3. Overall Evaluation of Universal Telecom Service 
 
In essence, universal service is effectively a social and political issue 
that involves distribution of income among the many different participants 
in the provision and use of communications. Distribution activities of 
regulation inevitably create efficiency losses,56 and lobbying?even rent 
seeking. With the scaling up of distribution (e.g. the Schools Fund in the 
US grew from 0.8% to 3% of the interstate revenue from 1998 to 2002), 
universal service will be attacked as being regulatory takings, and its 
constitutionality questioned, as the U.S. telecom case law indicates.57 
Notwithstanding the obvious drawbacks, universal telecom service 
has overcome the geographical distance and the financial divide between 
citizens within a country by averaging different costs. It even helped the 
cohesion of a state. Universal telecom service becomes an integral and 
indispensable part of our civic life worldwide, as also exemplified by 
other network utilities, such as gas, public transportation, electricity, 
water, etc. Universal telecom service cannot be convincingly said to be 
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regulatory takings, because its providers function only as an intermediary 
for the realization and funding of such service, as they pass the costs of 
providing universal service on to users. Admittedly, there is indeed 
discrimination between users who are paying and those who are receiving 
subsidies, but even the paying party benefits greatly from the networks 
and their network effect (the value of the networks will increase with the 
expansion of networks, and decrease with the shrinking of networks).  
 
III. A UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT FUND 
 
The universal telecommunications service mechanism has in many 
countries successfully closed the gap between individuals in terms of their 
ability to access telecom services. The most outstanding advantage of 
universal telecom service is its ease of implementation. It is a mechanism 
with grass-roots participation from the population, in which everybody 
can make his contribution, however trivial it might be. It is worthwhile for 
the international community to explore the possibility of transplanting this 
model of success to the copyright context by setting up a Universal 
Copyright Fund in order to narrow the copyright divide between 
countries. Two seemingly insurmountable obstacles lie gloomily ahead: 1. 
The universal telecommunications service mechanism has been 
operational only on the national level. To translate this national 
experience to a global endeavor would make a vast difference. 2. The 
structure and operation of such a Universal Copyright Fund is so complex 
that it can be easily dismissed as Utopian. To avoid these obstacles, the 
Universal Copyright Fund would have to stay local, at least at the initial 
stage. We will explain our conceptions of the nature and operation of this 
fund in the following section.  
 
A. It’s a Voluntary Act of Each Individual 
 
The essence of this fund is that people in the developed countries 
voluntarily help their fellow human kind in the developing and least 
developed countries via paying an amount of surcharge equivalent to that, 
which is used to cover universal telecom service in the individual 
developed countries. In other words, the fund is collected on an opt-in 
basis. One might intuitively wonders why would people in the developed 
countries be willing to offer help? Well, some might see that the 
significantly escalated globalization of the world market without some 
income redistribution scheme on a global level has its moral crises, and 
are would therefore be willing to make some humble meager contribution 
to alleviate the global digital divide. Some would help simply out of 
humanitarian inclination to treat their neighbors, whether domestic or 
52 National Taiwan University Law Review [Vol. 1: 2 
international, equally. For some, short-term donation would generate 
customers and revenues in the long run because of the increased value of 
an expanded communications network and other key infrastructures. Most 
important of all, the sum that individuals pay would be extremely small 
according to our scheme, too small to say no. Taking the US for example, 
in 2004 a total amount of about US$ 6,4 billion was paid to the universal 
service fund. Divided by 296,604,518 Americans (as of July 13, 2005), 
each would pay only US$ 21 per year.58 In Taiwan, an average of ca. NT$ 
63 (US$ 2) per person was paid for the universal service in 2005.59 
 
B. It’s Easy to Understand and Collect 
 
The Universal Copyright Fund could boast its ease of being 
understood and accepted by the general public of the donating countries, 
because it resembles the ideas and practice that are deeply rooted in civil 
societies, and its beneficial effects are self-explanatory. The Universal 
Copyright Fund could also easily exhibit fund-collecting efficacy by just 
following the model of universal telecom service, namely through 
automatic collection by telecom service providers of an implicit or 
preferably an explicit surcharge in the telecom services bills. It would 
save individual donators and the fund management the troubles and costs 
of transmitting and gathering the donations. 
 
C. It’s Not a Centralized Fund 
 
For some, the United Nations might be the most reputable and 
far-reaching international organization that proffers a wide range of 
programs to globally enhance social, economic, cultural and technological 
development, and is therefore suitable for the task of realizing the 
Universal Copyright Fund. If need be, it can easily utilize the expertise of 
its specialized agencies, i.e. WIPO and WTO. However, such a centralized 
fund has its downsides arising from the inevitable political complications, 
such as diplomatic recognition, and economic inefficiency in collecting 
and distributing funds. We therefore prefer a decentralized system in 
which every country runs its own Universal Copyright Fund and makes 
autonomous decisions on how it is put to use. In our scenario, every 
country will need to do more than passive donation and take the initiative 
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to engage developing and/or least developed countries. That again 
deepens and widens the cooperation between the donating countries and 
the receiving countries. 
 
D. Management and Usage of the Fund 
 
As mentioned earlier, the surcharge for the Universal Copyright Fund 
would be collected by telecom companies. It is recommended that the 
collected surcharge be passed on to the same mechanism that runs the 
universal service fund, to piggyback on its experiences. There is no need 
to set up an extra agency, which has to start from scratch. The Universal 
Copyright Fund would have a board of directors comprising representatives 
from the government and private sector as well. The fund would invite 
developing and the least developed countries to apply for the fund by 
conjuring up concrete plans of how best the fund can be utilized, then an 
independent review panel would evaluate the submitted proposals, and 
finally, the board of directors would prioritize and designate the recipient 
countries. As for the usage of the fund, a sensible guideline is to follow 
one of the proposals of the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force, i.e. for the 
improvement of connectivity with, increase of, access to, and reduction of 
costs of information communication infrastructure in the recipient 
countries, since it is the key to bridging the digital divide. 
 
IV. ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT IN OTHER AREAS 
 
In fact, our envisioning of a fund to solve a specific global problem is 
already a reality in other areas. Beginning from 2001, a partnership 
between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected 
communities was forged, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is 
an independent organization governed by an international board that 
consists of representatives of donors (some 45 countries) and recipient 
governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector (including 
businesses and philanthropic foundations) and affected communities. Also 
participating in ex officio capacity are representatives of the World Health 
Organization, UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS), 
and the World Bank. The Fund operates as a financial instrument, not an 
implementing entity, and supports programs that reflect national 
ownership. It evaluates proposals through an independent Technical 
Review Panel, thereby establishing a simplified, rapid and innovative 
grant-making process with operational transparency and accountability.60 
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Since 2001, the Global Fund has attracted US$ 4,7 billion in financing 
through 2008. In four rounds of funding, the Global Fund has approved 
assistance worth US$ 3,4 billion through more than 300 grants to 127 
countries.61 Given their similar ideas, structure and ways of operation, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the success of the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria sheds some promising light on the future 
of the Universal Copyright Fund.  
The Live 8 concerts and the resultant pledge made by the G8 leaders 
on July 7, 2005 to increase aid to Africa by US$ 25 billion by the year 
2010 validly demonstrate the readiness of the general public and the 
governments in the developed world to help.62 So if we can channel their 
attention and contributions to the Universal Copyright Fund, the Fund 
would have a fair chance of converging the digital divide that splits our 
common world. To launch this worldwide undertaking, we need first to 
establish a non-profit organization to promote the ideas. Once a country 
volunteers to be the pioneer and sets up a working example, the rest of the 
world will surely follow, sooner or later. 
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